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Which European model for elderly care? 







Long term care for the elderly is growing apace in developed economies. As growth is 
forcing change in existing production and delivery systems of elderly care services, the question 
arises as to how different systems compare in terms of cost-effectiveness, equity or quality. Based 
on an in depth survey carried out in Denmark, Ireland and Italy – the GALCA survey – this articles 
compares prevailing arrangements of home based long-term care in these three countries, focussing 
on the overall cost-effectiveness of the provisions as well as on employment equity for the care 
workers. Comparison between alternative types of provisions within each country suggests that 
home based care is generally, although not consistently, more cost-effective than care within 
institutions. Comparison of home care provisions across the three countries suggests that the Italian 
and the Danish systems are the most cost effective, but the Danish system is more equitable, 
overall.  These latter findings are partly explained by progressive replacement in Italy of unpaid 
family carers with low cost immigrant workers directly employed by the families and often 
cohabiting with the elderly, the migrant-in-the-family model of long term care. This new model has 
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1.  The questions 
 
   There is at present a wide variety of elderly care arrangements across industrial countries, 
each arrangement being situated at different intersections between the family, the state and the 
market (Bettio and Plantenga 2004; Gibson et al. 2003; Anttonen et al. 2003).  In some of the 
traditional family-centred care regimes demographic and economic change is altering both the 
demand for elderly care and the supply of unpaid, family care work, thus calling for an overhaul of 
the LTC model.  On the demand side, falling fertility and increasing life expectancy are causing the 
population to progressively age, thus boasting the demand for elderly care.  On the supply side, 
progressively weaker intra-family and inter-generational links, ever smaller households, and the 
increasing number of women in paid work are making the burden of elderly care no longer bearable 
by the family alone.   
To different degrees female immigrants in the role of elderly ‘minders’ are gradually 
replacing unpaid care by (female) family members in Mediterranean countries like Spain, Greece 
and Italy (Anthias and Lazaridis 2000; Salimbeni 2004;  Kasimis and Kassimi 2004; Steinhilber 
2003, Cavounidis 2002; Escrivà 2005; Bettio et al. 2006; Kofman and Parvati 2007; Lyberaki 
2008a, 2008b ). Change in elderly care arrangements is less pronounced in other European 
countries. Ireland and Denmark are cases in point, although the organisation of elderly care is very 
different in the two countries. Denmark has a Nordic type care regime where the family plays a 
modest role as provider, especially in elderly care, and the state substitutes for rather than 
supporting the family in its caring activities. Ireland is a borderline case between Mediterranean 
countries and countries like Germany and Austria where the family delivers care services based on 
the principle of subsidiarity, but the state takes a larger role as direct supplier of elderly care 
services. In Ireland there are no formal obligations on families to care but the state has no much 
formal responsibility in this area either, although it has contributed to developing a larger 
institutional care sector than is found in the Mediterranean.  
 In both Denmark and Ireland the adequacy of current elderly care arrangements is being 
questioned by growing and changing needs for old care services, although for very different 
reasons. Denmark has pioneered de-institutionalization since legislation brought to an end the 
construction of conventional residential nursing homes in 1987, and has since developed one of the 
most comprehensive public systems of home care, promoting independent, specialised housing at 
the same time. While this combination is often heralded as an example of efficient and 
technologically advanced elderly care sector in Europe (Capecchi 2004; Gibson et al. 2003:4), it has   3
been questioned from within with regard to the public/private mix – leading to the granting in 2002 
of the full choice of provider on the part of the elderly - but also with regard to poor social 
integration of the elderly. Ireland has so far avoided a major overhaul of its elderly care sector 
thanks to a relatively young population combined with relatively low participation of poorly 
educated women in the labour market. Since the late nineties, however, pressure for change 
stemming from the rise in dependency ratios and the progressive integration of women in the labour 
market has increased the number of immigrant workers in elderly care (Timonen and Doyle 2008)
1.      
 Comparative analysis of the Danish, Irish and Italian cases helps focusing on some key 
questions concerning actual versus desirable change.  Comparison between Ireland and Italy 
illustrates that, where the family is the main or a large provider, ongoing demographic and labour 
market trends are bound to lead to structural change in the organization of elderly care. Asking 
questions about the direction that change is taking makes sense because developments are recent 
enough and there is still room for policy intervention.  In particular, the ‘migrant in the family’ 
model that is ‘spontaneously’ emerging in Italy and other Mediterranean countries invites 
assessment against potential alternatives. How does this model compare with the Danish one?     
Should countries that can no longer (entirely) delegate elderly care to the family rely on 
immigration to bring provisions in line with demand? And should families be left in charge of 
organizing the supply of immigrants – which may imply a large informal sector – or should this 
supply be progressively integrated into formal public or private provision of services along the lines 
of Denmark?     
These are big and broad questions that cannot be answered by any single piece of research. 
However, the three countries comparison that this paper offers provides some initial answers. Our 
specific aim here is to focus on the supply side of home care provisions for the elderly and assess 
selected implications of the mix of provisions in different countries. Our choice of assessment 
criteria is conventional among economists and includes efficiency on the one side and equity on the 
other, though in our view the former need not necessarily be traded off for the latter.  Rather than 
efficiency we prefer, however, to focus on cost-effectiveness. The reason is that efficiency implies 
comparison of services of the same ‘quality’ whereas our data do not afford systematic information 
on the quality of services. Cost-effectiveness is understood here as lower cost per elderly person in 
care. As regards equity, much of the literature looks at equity in elderly care from the demand side 
(Österle 2001, Davies et al. 2000; Cuadras-Morato et al. 2000), thus evaluating the implications of  
                                                 
1 According to the authoritative Mercer Report, the number of elderly (65 years of age or more) 
needing Long Term Care is foreseen to more than double between 2011 and 2051 (Mercer 
Ltd., 2002, pp 72-75).   4
prioritizing medical versus paramedical services, acute versus chronic disabilities, and so. Since the 
focus here is on the supply side, the discussion will instead take the point of view of carers, both 
national family carers and immigrant carers, and assess some controversial aspects of the respective 
labour market positions.  
  Our primary data source is the GALCA survey (Gender Analysis of Long Term Care) 
which was carried out in 2003 as part of a European project coordinated by the Fondazione 
Brodolini (Rome) purporting to collect  comparable evidence on the input mix and of the costs of 
long term care services in Denmark, Ireland and Italy. Three local surveys on elderly home care 
were conducted in Roskilde (Denmark), Dublin (Ireland) and Modena (Italy) in 2003. The surveys 
were primarily designed to provide evidence on the full cost of alternative Long Term Care 
arrangements, with detailed recording of the inputs to each regular care activity as well as detailed 
information on the carers and the elderly being cared for. In addition to the GALCA survey we  rely 
on information from various sources about the characteristics and labour market conditions of 
female migrants in the elderly care sector in Italy.  
Section 2 below briefly introduces the GALCA survey while section 3 recalls some key   
features of the long term care service sector in the three regions covered by the survey. Section 4 
assesses the comparative cost effectiveness of home based care provisions in the three surveyed 
areas, paying special attention to the role of immigrant supplies in lowering costs in Italy.  Section 5 
carries the comparison of the three systems forward to issues of labour market equity, and in order 
to do so briefly reviews the characteristics and the conditions of migrant care workers in Italy.  
Section 6 concludes by weighing the overall findings on comparative cost-effectiveness and equity. 
 
2. The GALCA survey 
 
Since the GALCA survey is our primary source of information for the next three sections, a 
brief illustration of its main features is in order. The primary objective of the survey was assessing 
the comparative cost of alternative elderly care arrangements, i.e. home care versus care in a 
nursing home or hospitalisation. So called ‘main carers’ are the unit of analysis, namely persons in 
the family or in institutions that take ultimate charge of an elderly individual in need of care.   
Interviews with main carers were conducted locally:  in Dublin and Modena the information was 
collected in sample surveys of voluntary carers. In Roskilde it was necessary to contact the 
municipality of Roskilde in order to identify and interview the professional carers working there; 
the municipality also supplied own statistical data. In the trade off between statistical representation 
at national level and a thorough questionnaire and survey methodology a choice was made in favour   5
of the latter. Although the size of the sample in each of the three areas is small – complete records 
are available for about three hundred dependent elderly per area − statistical representativeness was 
ensured at local level for Ireland and Italy where a large telephone screening was used to sample the 
main carers.   A wide range of information was collected, including detailed data on the time spent 
by the main carers on the various  (elderly) care tasks as well as on own paid work. The detail of the 
records is such that the data can be used to estimate the full social cost of alternative care packages, 
including the opportunity cost of unpaid family care.  
 
3. Elderly care in Denmark, Ireland and Italy 
  
 Denmark, Ireland and Italy differ not only in the public/private mix of long-term care provision, as 
noted, but also in the balance between care in the community and institutional care.   Table 1 puts 
figures on these differences. In Denmark most of the care is delivered by public or private (market) 
providers, primarily local authorities that bear ultimate responsibility and are financed by general 
taxation. Italy and Ireland rely on the family to look after the majority of those being cared for and 
on cash transfers to partly support families.  The Carer’s Allowance in Ireland is paid as a cash 
transfer, and the maximum value of the Allowance at the time of the survey amounted to €129.60 
per week or about 24 percent percent of average industrial earnings
2. In Italy, the most important 
cash transfer item is the Attendance Allowance for dependent persons, which is not means tested, 
amounted to about €426 per month and was granted to some 6 percent of the population over sixty-
five at national level around 2003 (Gori 2003, p. 6).  In the region of Emilia Romagna where the 
Italian GALCA survey was conducted, the allowance corresponded to about 35 percent of the 
average industrial wage in 2003. Here, as elsewhere in Italy, the allowance is often combined with 
other cash transfers (e.g. the so called ‘Care Cheque’ granted by local authorities) and is used by 
families to pay for private, non family carers. 
 
Table 1 about here 
  
In all the three countries home care is the dominant form of provision and far more 
important than institutionalisation, with the latter being relatively more important in Ireland 
(Pacolet et al. 1999: table A3.1; Bettio and Plantenga 2004: figure 6; Gori 2005: tables 11 e 13). At 
the time of the survey over 90 percent of dependent elderly in Denmark and Italy were looked after 
in their own homes or apartment while more than a fifth of the elderly in Ireland were cared for in 
                                                 
2 Since 2007 the scheme has been extended to include half rate payment for those already on or 
claimed as Qualified Adults on certain other Social Welfare payments.   6
either public hospitals or private nursing homes. Moreover, the incidence of elderly receiving  home 
care was broadly comparable and ranges between 14 and 16 percent of the over 65: national 
estimates for Ireland put this figure at 14.8, the GALCA survey estimates a 16 percent figure for 
Modena while in Roskilde 14.5 percent of all pensioners received home care at the time of the 
survey.  
One feature common to all the three countries, albeit expected, is the sex of main carers who 
are overwhelmingly female, with the share of women among family carers ranging from 71 to 80 
percent in Ireland and Italy to 88 percent of professional carers in Denmark. Two key differences 
are housing and technology in Denmark and immigrant workers in Italy.   The policy in Denmark is 
to maintain elderly in their own homes or apartments until such time as a comprehensive social and 
psychological assessment shows inability to handle everyday activities of daily living (e.g., 
walking, dressing, bathing, toileting, cooking, cleaning, and shopping). At that stage serviced 
housing or sheltered accommodation are provided. In the Roskilde municipality about one quarter 
of the elderly in the GALCA sample lived in serviced apartments or sheltered accommodation. In 
some of these apartments – those offered to people with considerable functional disability – a 24 
hour domiciliary care service operates in the building. Sheltered accommodation is normally 
provided for elderly people who are unable to manage everyday activities in their own home but 
who do not need to be admitted to a nursing home. The accommodation is located in an institutional 
environment in which each elderly person has an apartment and professional carers are available 24 
hours a day.   
In addition to providing dedicated housing, the Danish municipalities offer to adapt elderly 
people homes, and supply technical and personal appliances to help them coping with their 
disabilities.  People with considerable disability are thus given the option to remain in their own 
home as long as possible, while homes are often transformed into mini public wards in the later 
stages of life.  
Investment in housing and home care technology allows for extreme rationalisation of 
professional cares’ time, as we shall document below. However, family carers in Italy have found a 
different way to ‘save’ on their own care time: they hire so called ‘minders’. Twenty seven percent 
of families in the GALCA Italian sample delegated most of the caring to paid, non family carers, 
usually migrant workers hired on a part time basis (12 percent of families) or as full-time, co-
residing ‘minders’ (15 percent of families). These way families, or rather the main carers, retain 
ultimate responsibility because they are in charge of hiring, coordinating and supervising minders. 
Some of them actually share minding or physical assistance with the helper they hire, while all of 
them act as interface between the elderly and public services.  In Modena, live-in minders were   7
reported to supply on average (weighted across disability levels) 66.9 hours per week compared 
with 28.5 reported for all principal caregivers.  Moreover, the figure for the live-in minders is likely 
to be  underestimated   since the latter are paid on a monthly basis but are practically ‘available’  24 
hours per day, 5-6 days per week, whereas families tend to consider only daily hours as working 
hours. As we shall document below, foreign minders are considerably ‘cheaper’ than any national, 
public or market substitute. 
Like Italy, Ireland has witnessed an inflow of immigrant workers into the care sector.  
However, the phenomenon is much more recent since it dates from the late nineties. It is also 
qualitatively different as migrant workers have found employment in both the formal and the 
informal (family) care sector, but the evidence for the latter is still anecdotal (Timonen and Dayle 
2008).   It is not surprising, therefore, that the GALCA survey yields hardly any evidence of Irish 
families hiring foreign workers to care for their elderly at home.   
 
4. Comparative cost-effectiveness 
 
  With these differences in mind we can now look at cost effectiveness. The level and 
structure of the actual, per week cost of providing home care to an elderly person of given disability 
are summarized in Tables 2 and 3 below. The inputs that have been ‘priced’ include the family 
carer’s time, assistance from public or public carers other than the family carer, visits to/from 
doctors, priests, nurses etc., hospitalization, assistance at day care centres, meals on wheels, housing 
appliances and housing adaptations. The costs are full social costs thereby comprising monetary 
outlays by families, the full cost of public and private services (e.g. the full cost of a day in hospital, 
of a public home helper or the fee of a private nurse) as well as the opportunity cost of care time 
from the family carer. 
Calculation of actual costs used quantities and mix of inputs derived from the GALCA 
survey, while representative unit prices were obtained from a variety of national sources. The 
(hourly) opportunity cost of carers’ time in Ireland and Italy was derived on the basis of gross 
average industrial earnings in the respective countries weighted by the way in which carers would 
allocate their hours between paid and unpaid work, voluntary work and leisure if they were not 
committed to providing care for the elderly.  Unpaid work and voluntary work were both valued at 
the expected market wage, i.e. gross average industrial earnings multiplied by the probability of 
engaging in market work in the country’s sample of carers. Leisure was valued at a quarter of the 
market valuation of the weighted value of paid work, unpaid work and voluntary work.  Finally, 
costs were separately obtained for five levels of disabilities as well as for the ‘average’ elderly in   8
the (national) sample, and were made comparable across the three countries by using Purchasing 
Power Parity conversion rates. 
The full details of this costing exercise are reported elsewhere (Reinicke 2004; Hughes et al. 
2004; Bettio et al. 2007). Our interest here is in two main set of results, respectively, the 
comparative overall costs of home care across countries and the relative cost of home care versus 
institutionalization in each country (in a nursing home or in a hospital). Starting with the latter, our 
findings indicate that,  while home care may be the option that elderly people prefer, it is generally 
but not consistently the least expensive option once the opportunity costs of unpaid family labour is 
factored in.  In Modena and Roskilde, home care was found to be definitely ‘cheaper’ than either 
hospitalization or care in a nursing home at all level of dependency, except for the most disabled 
elderly in Roskilde for whom care in a nursing home was estimated to cost marginally less. In 
Dublin, home care costs were estimated to be consistently lower than hospitalization but care in a 
nursing home was found to be more cost effective at intermediate to high levels of dependency.  
However, some caution must be attached to these findings because the full cost of home care 
must include two items that turned out to be potentially problematic for comparison across 
countries.  The first is personal consumption. The relevant data can be derived from household 
budget surveys suitable for studying macroeconomic aggregates – consumption income savings etc. 
– or from household income surveys suitable for interpersonal comparisons. In both cases personal 
consumption figures might include items like payment for private home helpers, or nurses that are 
also entered as separate items in the reported costing exercise, thus giving rise to potential 
duplications that it is not easy to identify and remove. The second problematic cost item is hours of 
supervision by unpaid family carers. Unlike hours of physical care – like bathing, feeding, 
administering medicines – and of instrumental care – like shopping house cleaning, ironing – both 
of which tend to be reported with an acceptable degree of accuracy, hours of supervision are fraught 
with measurement errors. To mention only the most apparent reasons for such errors, unpaid hours 
of supervisions may be exaggerated or underestimated depending on cultural stereotypes. Also, and 
perhaps more importantly, respondents may find it difficult to precisely separate supervision time 
from time for physical and instrumental care. Finally costing night time supervision by family 
carers who co-reside with the elderly is problematic: should such time be priced at the opportunity 
cost of the carer even when the total declared care time runs up to 24 hours per day?  
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully address such problems. However, this is not 
strictly required for the kind of inter-country comparisons of home care that serve our purposes.   
Once differences in purchasing power parity are accounted for, in fact, personal consumption of 
elderly people in need of care (and thus often confined at home) is not likely to vary substantially   9
across our three countries.  We therefore believe that errors are minimized if we compare costs net 
of personal consumption. As for the cost of unpaid supervision, we present two sets of calculations, 
respectively including and excluding such cost
3.  
  The findings in table 2 must be assessed with these caveats in mind.  Total costs (net of 
personal consumption) are broken down into five levels of disability – from A to E in ascending 
order – and are reported in actual Euros (first set of figures) and in Purchasing Power Parity figures 
(PPPs, second set of figures).  Average cost figures across disability levels (at the bottom of the 
table) have been computed standardizing the composition of the elderly in the sample to the 
disability distribution reported for Italy
4. Two sets of PPPs averages are reported, respectively 
excluding and including the opportunity cost of supervision by the (unpaid) family carer.   
  Costs tend to progress along the disability scale, which conforms to expectations. The only 
exception is for category D both in Dublin and in Modena, principally on account of scant     
observations in this group. If we take average values, the ranking of countries with respect to costs 
effectiveness is the same whether or not we standardize for purchasing power parity and whether or 
not the cost of supervision is included: Italy shows the most cost effective arrangements followed 
by Denmark and Ireland.  What varies with standardization and the inclusion of supervision cost is 
the actual cost gap between countries. Considering the inevitable degree of approximation entailed 
by these exercises and the fact that the gap would diminish in percentage terms if personal 
consumption was included, Italy and Denmark turn out not to be too far apart when costs are 
expressed in PPPs, with extra costs for Denmark ranging from 13 to 25 percent (depending on 
whether supervision by family  
carers is included or excluded).  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
In order to gain insight into these findings we must look at the structure of costs. Here we 
shall confine our attention to Denmark and Italy because they appear to have achieved fairly similar 
levels of costs despite the radically different organization of home care.  The structure of costs is 
reported in section A of Table 3 and is complemented by figures on the hours of care in section B of 
                                                 
3 Because, however, the cost of paid supervision (i.e. supervision by private or public home helper) 
suffers from none of shortcoming cited for unpaid supervision it is fully included in the 
calculation. 
4 We have used the Italian distribution for this standardisation for heuristic purposes, since the 
process of aging in Italy (and in Modena in particular) has gone further than elsewhere in 
Europe and is thus likely to anticipate future developments in other countries. However, any 
of the three distributions would have been appropriate on strictly statistical grounds.   10
the Table. All the figures refer to category of dependency C corresponding to intermediate-to-high 
levels
5.  
Clearly, hours supplied by home carers are the principal cost item in both countries. 
Families in Modena variously combined unpaid labour by the family carer with paid services from 
migrants (minders) , provisions like house cleaning bought on the private market and skilled home 
help supplied by the municipality (e.g. to bathe, clean and give basic medication to a bed-ridden 
elderly), the three latter items being factored in as ‘home help’. Unpaid care by family members in 
Denmark was not recorded by the survey. In the assessment of the Danish researchers taking part in 
the survey care by family members is sufficiently negligible compared to home help supplied by the 
public to make it worthwhile for a survey on costs to concentrate on the latter. The available 
evidence is broadly consistent with this view
6.    
In our estimation, hours of home care account for a share of 55.3 percent of total costs in 
Italy and of 52.6 percent in Denmark. Contrast the similarity in these shares with the difference in 
average hours of care: 12.3 hours care per elderly per week in Denmark compared with 43.6 hours 
in Italy.
7  Clearly, a strong difference in the per hour cost is implied, with the high cost country – 
Denmark – being intent upon minimizing labour units in order to keep the total amount down and 
the low cost country – Italy – achieving an even better result by keeping unit labour cost low.  
 
Table 3 about here 
   
                                                 
5 Because input levels and input proportions vary considerably across levels of dependency, we 
have chosen to confine comparison to a single category rather than taking average values, 
even if this implies a limited number of observations (about 40). 
6 Based on a survey of about 1050 individuals carried out in 1999, Leeson (2004: Table 1.3) reports 
that the percentage of persons aged 60 years and over in receipt of various forms of help from 
their social network (family excluding spouse, friends, neighbours and volunteers) varied from 
less than one percent for personal care to 4/5 percent for shopping, cleaning and laundry, 
reaching a peak of 21 percent only for gardening and house repairs. Care by spouses is more 
frequent, but there is no hard evidence on the extent of the latter. While, in principle, neglect 
of unpaid family care could be a source of underestimation of the total costs of home carers 
for Denmark, this is balanced up by the fact that in Italy unpaid care from family members 
other than the main carer or from friends and volunteers was recorded but not factored in the 
costs.   
7 In order to enhance comparability the discussion in the text refers to the figures that exclude 
supervision by the family carer (the totals in the shaded cells of the table) while they include 
hours of paid supervision, e.g. by foreign minders in Italy and public home helpers in 
Denmark. As shown by Table 2, however, Italy’s total costs remain lower even if the hours of 
supervision by the family carer are factored in.    11
 Labour inputs are kept in check in Denmark by housing and technology
8. The 4.4 percent 
share of costs devoted to personal and technical appliances in Denmark highlights the role of 
technology and rationalization of tasks in the organization of home care. The maximum weekly 
hours an elderly person in the Roskilde sample received was 47 hours, but the average ranged from 
1.2 for the least dependent group to 12.1 for the intermediate dependent group up to 34.1 for the 
most dependent. The reason is extreme rationalisation: some municipalities calculate in single 
minutes how long the services being provided must take.  The price for such rationalisation is, 
often, loneliness for the elderly person.  To quote from Hughes et al. (2004, p. 19): 
 
“The very low number of care hours provided for dependent elderly people in Roskilde is generally 
regarded as inadequate. Their physical needs are provided for but their psychological needs are 
not. The dependent elderly in Denmark have little contact with people other than their carers and 
are consequently rather isolated. The rapid turnover of caring staff employed by the municipalities 
accentuates this isolation. In some municipalities and especially in Copenhagen students take jobs 
as home helpers to partially pay for their studies. The delivery of care through paid professionals 
means that most of the elderly, and primarily elderly women, are left in their own home often with 
no social networks and few daily contacts with other people”. 
 
    Lewinter (1999) suggests that this image of the lonely elderly underestimates the 
contribution of family and friends to the social life of the elderly, and  Leeson argues that perhaps 
the main role that the Danish family retains is  helping its older member to remain “socially active 
and included (take part in family events)” ( Leeson 2004, p. 14). While these studies qualify the 
divide between the Danish and the Italian model that emerges from our data, they cannot detract 
from the fact that the divide remains large.   
  The Italian families in Modena could afford to be generous with care time due to a 
combination of low opportunity cost and low actual cost for substitutes for their caring time. The 
opportunity cost of carers’ time was valued at € 2.7 per hour in Modena, less than half of the 
average net female earnings in industry in the region (€ 5.8) and lower than the minimum 
contractual figure for an unskilled  home helper (€ 5.13)
9.  More specifically: 
(i)  because of a much older population structure, carers in Italy are themselves much older 
than their Irish counterpart and thus less likely to have given up employment in order to 
                                                 
8 Having chosen not to report personal consumption (including rent) there is no trace of role of 
housing in the cost structure that we report.  Housing costs are a very complex cost item 
accounting for which is beyond the scope of this paper. For a general account of the role of 
dedicated housing and of technology in the efficient organization of the Danish care sector see 
Capecchi (2004).  
9 Bettio et al. (2007: Table 27) and own calculations on the Bank of Italy Household survey for 
2002 (microdata).   12
care for a family elderly:   merely 17 percent of carers in the Modena sample were below 
the age of 50. Moreover, until recently, early retirement has been extensively used in 
Italy to soften the impact of redundancies, thus freeing at least some older carers from 
the need to choose between paid market work and unpaid care work. Both these factors 
lower the probability of being in work, and therefore the opportunity cost of caring. 
(ii)  carers from a two earner family in Modena were often able to remain in the labour 
market due to their ability to hire immigrants to provide care on a live-in basis in the 
home or by coming to the home on a daily basis.    
The latter feature, which we interchangeably refer in this paper to as ‘migrant in the family’ or 
the ‘foreign minder’ solution, clearly distinguishes the Italian elderly care system from that of 
Denmark or Ireland. Crucial elements in the decision to hire non family carers in order to retain 
employment are wage and employment conditions.  For reasons that we shall expound below, 
starting from the 90s the demand for elderly carers met plentiful supply of female immigrants 
originating primarily from Eastern European Countries, Latin America and the Philippines (Bettio 
et al. 2006). With the complicity of the informal labour market, some families still impose 
exploitative wages and conditions of work. However, thanks to successive regularization of 
immigration flows and the granting of residence and work permits to those already working, a non 
negligible share of contracts between families and immigrant carers are legal and abide to at least 
some minimum contractual standards.   
In particular, the municipality of Modena has set up a scheme that encourages families to 
legalize the position of their live-in foreign carers, and the number of contracts signed under this 
scheme totalled about 300 in 2003 and increased later.  Average gross costs to the family of live-in 
minders in these contracts amounted to € 987 euro per month inclusive of the social security 
contributions owed by the family and corresponding to net earnings of about € 800-850 per month 
for the migrant
10.  If we assume that this earnings figure for Modena is sufficiently close to the 
clearing market rate in medium to large cities of Northern Italy and divide it by the hours of work 
estimated by the survey (66.9 per week, as noted or 288 per month), we get an hourly cost of about 
€ 3.4, not much higher than the opportunity cost for a family carer in Modena.  Hiring external 
carers or minders was more expensive on an hourly basis. However, the contractual minimum was 
about € 5 per hour at the time of the survey, and the actual pay needs not be much higher, even on a 
regular contract, if the supply of candidates is plentiful as has been the case so far.  
                                                 
10 Other sources confirm this order of magnitude for the North of the country, and not necessarily 
for ‘official’ contracts only (Caritas 2003).   13
It is instructive to compare the hourly cost figures that we just derived for in-living 
immigrant workers with the cost of potential alternatives. The hourly fee for a care worker from 
local cooperatives in Modena, typically a native worker, ranged between €8 and €13 at the time of 
the survey. Public home helpers were far more expensive since their cost to the municipality of 
Modena was €19.8 per hour, more than in Roskilde (€14.9) although this latter comparison may be 
distorted by differences in the skill mix.   
Italian families appear, in fact, to efficiently combine three different types of labour – family 
carers, hired minders and public home helpers – treating them as complements. The minder is 
dependent on the family carer for coordinating his/her work and for complementing his/her work 
with tasks requiring skills that the migrant may lack, like knowledge of language or of the way 
institutions work.   At the same time the public carer is more skilled at handling severely disabled 
elderly than either the family carer or the minder are, and s/he is likely to be far more productive on 
a per hour basis. Thus cheaper migrant labour is mainly allocated to minding and physical 
assistance, while the family carer supplies coordination and social skills whenever needed, and the 
public home helper chips in briefly for paramedical or skilled tasks like handling and washing an 
elderly person confined to bed. 
Summarizing on cost-effectiveness, in order to be cost effective Denmark cuts down on the 
quantity (hours) of professional care while Italy keeps labour costs of carers down.  The downside 
of the Danish solution is low social integration for the elderly. This raises questions about of the 
quality of care provisions and, specifically, whether they can really be assumed to be comparable 
across the three countries as we are doing here.  In contrast to the Danish solution, the ‘foreign 
minder’ solution that has spontaneously developed in Italy may preserve the human touch of family 
care, but raises issues of exploitation and unequal treatment of foreign carers. Because most of the 
migrant carers are women and some leave their own family behind, such issues include the risk that 
receiving countries like Italy subtract care resources from the countries of origin for immigrants. 
We shall examine issues of equity in the next section, while we lack information to pursue the 
question of quality any further.   
The ‘foreign minder’ solution also raises doubts about long term sustainability.  With less 
than one a half child per woman in many regions of Italy, and an increasing share of childless 
couple, the elderly of the future will be more at risk of living on their own and not being able to 
count on a family carer to organise and co-ordinate paid help for them. Moreover, migrant care 
workers from Eastern European countries like Albania, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, but also 
Chechnya, and Moldavia are known to be well represented among minders in Italy (see below). 
They are especially valued by families on account of cultural similarity and ability to quickly learn   14
the language.  Since most of them migrate because of lack of opportunities back home, the question 
arises of how long it will take for the economy of some of these countries to pick up and dry out 
emigration flows. 
Since robust evaluation of sustainability requires separate research, in what follows we shall 
be primarily concerned with assessing equity. In order to set the stage for the discussion on equity, 
the next section looks more closely into the recent history and the current conditions of female 




5. Migrant carers and equity   
 
Like other European countries, Italy changed from being a region of emigration to one of 
immigration starting from the 80s.  While high permeability of borders played and continues to play 
an important role, it is primarily the existence of a large underground economy
11, coupled with an 
immigration policy of ex-post regularisations rather than ex-ante control that pulled migration flows 
into Southern Europe (Reyneri 2003). The overwhelming majority of migrant workers first entered 
Italy and Southern European countries without a work permit (either on a tourism or a student visa, 
or crossing the border illegally), found work in unregistered and undeclared jobs, and stayed, or 
overstayed their visa, without  residency. Some took advantage of repeated regularization episodes 
to legalize their positions, while others preferred to remain underground.  Between the mid eighties 
and 2003 Italy witnessed five regularisation waves, Spain five, Greece two and Portugal three, 
involving, respectively 1502 thousand, 555 thousand, 722 thousand, and 181 thousand individuals. 
Successive episodes of regularisations created expectations that acted as a strong pull factor 
(Boswell and Straubhaar 2004). 
In the specific case of elderly care, however, pulling factors would not have sufficed on their 
own to attract enough supply, were it not for the push exercised by the political and economic 
collapse of the Eastern bloc. The arrival of large numbers of migrant female workers from the East 
allowed a typically South European immigration pattern to spontaneously develop into a new model 
of elderly care.  
                                                 
11 ‘Underground economy’ is meant as  paid activities that are not fully registered and may 
therefore evade, at least in part, administrative and legal  rules on taxation, social security 
contribution, safety, labour standards.   15
Developments in Italy tell this story especially well. The 1970s and the 1980s witnessed an 
increasing inflow of female immigrants “on their own”, i.e. not having moved to re-unify with their 
family. They came mainly from countries with catholic or historical/colonial ties: Africa (former 
Italian colonies and Capo Verde) and South East Asia (Philippines). The Church was often 
instrumental in bringing these early migrants into the country in response to a waning local supply 
of middle-aged, low income women as well as an ever thinner stream of “internal migration of 
domestic servants – young girls from poor, rural backgrounds who went to the big cities to work as 
maids for rich families” (King and Zontini 2000, p. 46). 
With the arrival of Peruvian women in the 90s, there was a first ‘spontaneous’ move to 
employ female migrants as elderly minders.  Following the collapse of the Eastern bloc a much 
larger and heterogeneous flow of female migrants from Poland, Ukraine, Romania and Russia 
entered the market of personal care in the mid nineties and rapidly changed the organisation of work 
in the elderly care sector throughout the country. 
Prior to large scale immigration, families had tried to cope with the sudden rise in long-term 
care needs by resorting to a mix of solutions, from an increase in the (unpaid) work load for women, 
to exit from the labour market of female carers when the double burden became unbearable, to 
reliance on the meagre supply of public helpers or a burgeoning market of private home carers, to 
institutionalisation (in hospitals or in nursing homes). All such options were either costly or 
rationed. Cheap immigrant labour outcompeted expensive alternatives and/or filled the public 
services gap.  
The hiring of foreign minders was so popular among families that political pressure forced yet 
another call for regularisation upon a fairly unwilling government in 2002.  The success of this call 
was unprecedented and partly unexpected: some 702 thousand illegal immigrants applied, with little 
less than half (341 thousand) of them demanding regularization as worker in domestic services.  
Another way to emphasize the extent to which this regularization was targeted on home helpers is to 
note that 2 migrants applied for regularization every 100 regular employees, compared with 11.5 
migrants for every 100 housewives (Table 4).   
The 2002 regularization scheme radically changed the composition of migrants by 
nationality as well as sex. Source countries of predominantly female migration like Romania, 
Ukraine, and Poland recorded the highest incidence of regularizations in their respective 
community, signalling that flows from these countries were both the most recent and the ones 
growing more rapidly.     16
This pattern continued into the second half of the present decade, with about half of the 
applications for a regular work permit in 2006 attributable to the domestic service sector. Because 
of the high incidence of irregular employment it is difficult to give a precise figure on the stock of 
elderly care worker currently employed by families.  According to the latest estimates they  totalled 
774,000 in 2008 and cared for 6.6 percent of the population older than 65 years of age (Pasquinelli 
and Rusmini 2008, pp. 9-11). The overwhelming majority are foreigners (about 90 percent) with the 
largest groups originating from Romania, Ukraine and Moldova. Estimates of the share of migrant 
workers without a regular contract varies depending on source and year of the survey: the latest 
figure is two thirds (Pasquinelli and Rusmini 2008, p. 10), but earlier surveys suggest a lower figure 
(IREF-ACLI 2007, pp. 33)
12. 
Eastern European female migrants tend to differ radically from previous waves of migrants 
as well as from present day female migrants from non-European countries. In order to discuss 
equity and social inclusion it is important to articulate these differences.  For heuristic purposes we 
may divide female migrants into two large groups. The first group broadly corresponds to women 
from the Eastern bloc, while the second comprises migrants from less developed and more distant 
countries, especially Latina American and the Philippines.  The typical Eastern European female 
migrant is a woman with a diploma, middle-aged and married with children who left her own 
family behind (Piperno 2007).  Before EU enlargement most of them entered on a temporary tourist 
visa; enlargement has made entry straightforward for important supplies like Polish women first and 
Romanians women later, although work permits are still restricted. Many of them pursue a 
temporary migration project and strive to attain what may be called ‘project income’, i.e. they are 
interested in staying the minimum period necessary to save income earmarked for specific projects 
back home like building a house, paying for children’s college, buying a car or some household 
appliance
13. A non negligible share work in relays (i.e. in rotation with other women) in order to be 
able to take up care work in the host country while meeting familial responsibilities in their home 
countries (Morokvasic 1996; Morokvasic et al. 2003).  
By contrast, female migrants from more distant countries tend to be less educated and 
include a higher proportion of single and younger women. Even those who are married or separated 
and have left their own family behind follow a long-term migration project.  Their participation 
                                                 
12  See also the newspaper  Il Sole 24, 2
nd of April 2007: 1,5) for  estimates of all foreign workers in 
domestic employment. 
13 See Caritas 2003, Immigrazione. Dossier Statistico 2003, p. 297, and, among others, Ambrosini 
and Boccagni, 2003 for Trentino.   17
behaviour may not be driven by specific projects either because their return home is uncertain or 
because they remit their savings on a regular basis to support the family they left behind. 
While the reality of migrants in the care sector (or in other sectors) is far more complex than 
implied by this sketchy partition into two groups, and is constantly evolving, the purpose here is to 
clarify issues,  not to  render a realistic and comprehensive account of present day migrant carers in 
Italy. Our interest in emphasizing this partition is not only the fact that exposure to labour market 
discrimination or the cost of having to neglect the family left behind (the so called ‘care drain’) 
differs across groups of migrants, but also the possibility that discrimination or care drain means 
different things for different groups, calling for a revision of these concepts.  
Let us look more closely at the frequent allegation of discrimination in pay and/or working 
conditions. As it is well known, the debate on labour market discrimination dates back from the 
seventies and is a very thorny one, with many issues still unresolved.  Nevertheless, a largely 
consensual definition emerged among economists (Cain 1986) that may be put as follows:   
discrimination exists when the following conditions are verified (i) systematic wage and/or income 
disparities persists between clearly identifiable groups, not individuals, and (ii) the said income or 
wage disparities originate from lower pay for the discriminated group despite potentially equal 
productivity across groups.    Potential productivity is, in turn inferred (and measured) from a 
vector of individual characteristics ranging from age, education, work attitudes that may influence 
actual productivity on the job. Clearly this definition allows group discrimination to exist even 
when occupational segregation prevents between groups direct comparisons of wages for the same 
job. 
If we accept this definition,  both our groups of migrant carers would in all likelihood be 
found to suffer from discrimination by any standard statistical and econometric investigation 
(assuming that the right data were available for this exercise):  migrants are clearly identifiable; 
they are rather eager to work; by virtue of being ‘women’ they are assumed to be as ‘productive’ as  
national workers in occupations like ‘minding’ where (good) knowledge of language is not strictly 
required although it may be valued (and even compensated) as a desirable ‘extra’. Yet, judging by 
all available evidence they earn less than local (female) workers of comparable qualifications.  
In order to briefly document inequality of pay, let’s go back to the earnings of live-in 
minders on ‘regularised’ contracts in Modena. Recall that net earnings amounted to some 800-850 
euro per month. The comparison with average net female industrial earnings in Modena is not so 
unfavourable, since the latter amounted to about 980 per month at the time of the survey
14, but gets 
                                                 
14 Capp estimates for 2002 updated using the official rate of inflation (cf. Capp 2003).    18
much worse once we discount for differences in hours:  on an hourly base a female employee in 
industry earned between € 5.8 (blue collar) and € 6.8 (white collar) compared with our earlier 
estimate of about € 3.4 an hour for a live-in minder.   
From the point of view of migrants, however, calculations do not look as unfavourable as 
the above figures would suggest. Being a live-in minder means, in fact, saving on board and lodging 
in areas where rents are very high. So, earnings can be largely saved. At the same time, (Eastern) 
female immigrant minders interviewed in Modena around the time of the survey revealed that their 
wages were from 7 times (Romania) up to 15 times (Moldavia) what could be earned, or what was 
earned by their husbands  back home (Mottura 2004). The instinctive reaction to these disclosures is 
that there is something disturbing in the notion that these workers are discriminated. The reason is 
that discrimination is often equated with lack of equity, some kind of unfairness that damages or 
puts at a disadvantage the group object of discrimination. Such concept may be problematic when 
analysing migrants.    
The notion of ‘purchasing power’ may be relevant here. Consider applying this notion to 
that group of eastern minders that migrate with a ‘project income’ in mind. The share of earnings 
that they periodically bring home to spend in their project is likely to more than double in 
purchasing power terms. However, the notion of discrimination on grounds of lower pay presumes a 
one to one correspondence between nominal levels of pay and the associated  purchasing power; in 
other words it assumes that  foreign and national workers face the same price structure, that of the 
receiving country. The question is whether discrimination in the guise of unequal nominal pay for 
the same or comparable work can still be equated with unfairness and disadvantage when this 
correspondence no longer holds.    
Note that there is an asymmetry in this respect between national workers and temporary 
migrant workers. While temporary migrants can take the earnings they save back home to boost 
their purchasing power in a not very distant future, this is hardly an option for national workers 
since many goods and services can only be consumed where one lives.  Finally, matters are 
obviously different for long-term or permanent migrants although the purchasing power argument 
may be extended, within limits, to the remittances they send regularly back home.    
While the purchasing power argument may be a healthy correction to indiscriminate 
victimization of migrants (Kofman 2003), the risk that it may be used to justify all sort of 
exploitation of foreign workers is all too apparent. However, this same argument can be turned on 
its head and used to the opposite effect.  To the extent, that is, that low pay for migrants may put 
some downward pressure on national wages indirectly rather than indirectly – there is evidence that   19
occupational segregation or trade union regulations prevent direct competition between migrants 
and nationals (Venturini 2001) – it may be argued that national workers might suffer since they 
cannot compensate deteriorating pay conditions with access to cheaper goods and service markets.  
From a gender perspective, acknowledging the purchasing power argument may help to 
resolve the seeming opposition between those who portray female migrants solely as victims of 
exploitation – indeed double exploitation, as foreign workers and as women – and those who view 
their migratory project as expression of emancipation. As the above example of Rumanian and 
Moldavian women makes clear, migration for these women is bound to imply some forms of 
empowerment, and this is equally true of, say, care workers from the Philippines sending 
remittances back home that weigh largely on the family budget.   
Let us turn now to the issue of care drain. A fairly cynical economist would argue that 
reconciliation between work in a distant country and caring for one’s family left behind is 
influenced by how much care can be bought back home with the wages received in the host country. 
From an equity perspective, however, the weakness of this argument is that caring for one’s own 
family should be viewed as a right and not only as a task.  In this respect the ‘foreign minder’ 
solution (or indeed any ‘foreign carer’ arrangement) involves clear cut equity costs (Ehrenreich   
and Hochschild 2003), although assessment of these costs may be problematic.   
Summing up on equity, because of conceptual and measurement difficulties it is much 
harder to rank home care arrangements with respect to equity than with respect to cost-
effectiveness. We have raised rather than solving two of the equity issues that are brought to the 
fore by the increase in migrant carers in Italy. The loss of equity implied by labour market 
discrimination of foreign migrants may be lessened by the fact that some of them can exploit in 
their favour a purchasing power differential. At the same time the loss of equity entailed by the fact 
that some women migrants are forced to give up the right to care for their own family must be 
weighted against the fact migration offers women a chance to redress the imbalance of power 
within the family, as well as in society.   
If all this is taken into account it is not at all clear whether stronger reliance on unpaid 
family carers typified by Ireland in the early 00s is more equitable than the ‘foreign carer’ solution 
currently favoured by Italy. Is it more unfair to underpay migrant workers or to have a family 
member to give up or reduce paid work without any compensation? On balance, the Danish model 
of professional care workers is probably superior.  Public professional carers may be relatively 
underpaid compared to equally skilled workers in other occupations (Reinicke 2004), but issues of 
discrimination are likely to be far weaker than for immigrant carers in informal employment in   20
Italy.  Also, insertion of foreign female migrants into public professional care permits more 
equitable solutions to the ‘care drain’ problem because it offers migrants career-ladder type of 
employment and, therefore, much higher chances for full integration in society. At the same time, 
however, it is likely to limit their numbers due to constraints to public budgets, thus closing to some 
a road to emancipation. To add to complexity, the question of equity overlaps with the larger 
question of the different quality of employment that the different care systems create as well as with    
the question of the quality of future economic growth that the expansion of different care sector 
may favour (Simonazzi 2009).  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 The issues of cost-effectiveness and equity that are raised by the comparison of long term 
care provisions in Denmark, Ireland and Italy need further conceptual refinement as well as more 
empirical research in order to be addressed satisfactorily. Given the current state of knowledge we 
would conclude that the ongoing evolution in Italy from family services to migrant-in-the-family 
arrangements entails a moderate trade off between gains in cost-effectiveness and losses in equity.   
The comparison between Ireland and Italy (at the time of the survey) suggests that the new 
combinations of family and migrants in the latter country may not be less equitable than heavier 
reliance on family labour in the former, while affording some gains in cost-effectiveness. These 
gains are ascribable, in part, to the differential in earnings between migrant carers and (female) 
worker who hire them and would otherwise be forced to quit their job or reduce their hours of work. 
The comparison between Denmark and Italy suggests, however, that the costs advantages for the 
Italy are relatively contained and need to be weighted against comparatively lower equity.   
In addition to the need for a better balance between cost-effectiveness and equity, the Italian 
solution raises questions of long run sustainability that we have deliberately neglected in this paper.  
We have also neglected the larger question of the quality of employment created by the different 
care arrangements and of the quality of the care being offered. 
It is all the more important to address these issues as clear evidence is now available that  in 
Europe countries such as Spain or Greece are following similar paths to the one illustrated for Italy. 
While developments in all these countries are part of a wider process of migrant labour leading the 
expansion of the care sector, the Mediterranean migrant-in-the-family solution for long term care 
raises specific challenges.     21
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Table 1 . Percentage of Dependent Elderly Persons Being Cared for by the Family, by Private 
Services or by Public Services in  Denmark, Ireland, and Italy 
 
 Providers  Denmark  Ireland   Italy 
Family and friends  Very low*  76.6  83.1 
Family or private 
services 
Very low*  11.8 
Public or private 
services 
Universal coverage 





* See section 3 for details. 
Source: Hughes et al. (2004); Bettio et al. (2007); Reinicke (2004). 
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Table 2.  Estimated  social cost of care, per week, per elderly, 2003* 
      
Category of Dependency  Roskilde Dublin  Modena
At actual prices  Euro 
A  230.3 313.2 111.2
B  280.3 437.3 208.5
C  343.0 607.4 273.5
D  445.0 800.6 213.6
E  722.2 645.4 307.7
At PPPs   (Euro, EU=1) 
A  178.8 227.6 115.8
B  217.7 317.9 217.1
C  266.3 441.4 284.7
D  345.5 581.9 222.3
E  560.8 469.0 320.3
Average: actual prices using common weights 
 388.4 513.7  218.4
Average in PPPs (EU=1) using common weights 
 
   301.5 451.6  227.3
Average in PPPs, adding the cost of supervision by family carer 
 301.5 698.7  261.3
* Net of personal consumption, including imputed rent 
Source: our calculation using GALCA survey data; Eurostat for PPPs. 
Notes: For details on the methodology and GALCA survey data see Hughes et al. (2004), Hughes et al. (2004b: Table 
6.6), as well as Bettio et al. (2007: Table 29) and Reinicke (2004: Table 10). Average total costs in this table do not 
correspond to total costs reported by these sources because consumption (including imputed rent) has been dropped 
from the calculations. 
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Table 3. Cost structure and hours of care, 2003 
(Intermediate category of dependency: C) 
  
A. structure of costs for category of dependency C   
Cost item      Roskilde    Modena
Hours of home care           
            physical+ instrumental care by family carer (opportunity cost)   negligible     17.6
            Private (paid) or public home help    52.6    37.7
      
Use of hospital    31.8    29.0
Use of nursing home         3.3
Doctor     0.9    7.7
Public health nurse         0.3
Private nurse         1.9
Meals on wheals             
Chiropodist/physiotherapist        2.0
Priest         0.2
Day care      10.0      
Housing adaptation    0.3    0.3
Personal and technical appliances  4.4      
 TOTAL       100.0     100.0
TOTAL adding opportunity cost of supervision    100.0    114.7
         
B.  Hours of home care for category of dependency C 
         
Home help including paramedical and supervision  12.1    25.7
Family carer         
                   Physical+instrumental   negligible    17.9
                   Supervision  negligible   14.9
TOTAL      12.1     43.6
TOTAL adding supervision by family carer  12.1    58.5
Source:  Our calculations based on the GALCA survey results and on Reinicke (2004: table 10)   28
















Ratio (%)   
a d c d e  a/d b/e 
North-West  135,410 98,533  233,943  4,800  552  2.8 17,9 
North-East  73,683 58,608  132,291  3,385  366  2.2 16,0 
Centre  91,807 112,045 203,852  3,172  507  2.9 22,1 
South  50,929  60,287  111,216 3,061 1,028  1.7 5,9 
Islands  9,206 11,648 20,854  1,431  526  0.6 2,2 
ITALY  361,035 341,121 702,156  15,849  2,979  2.3 11,5 
Source: Ministero dell’Interno   
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